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Abstract 
James Tartaglia makes original use of the idea of transcendence in order to answer various 
philosophical questions of contemporary and historical importance. I tackle the attempt to use his 
transcendent hypothesis to solve the problem of consciousness. Tartaglia describes the problem of 
consciousness as arising because we conceive of the objective world as composed of “centreless” 
objects and that any view that attempts to identify consciousness as a part of the world as presented 
to objective thought will fail since consciousness is inherently centred. His proposed solution is to 
suggest that a transcendent reality must be able to account for consciousness, but I argue that his 
characterisation of this reality entails that it too must be composed of centreless parts and thus the 
transcendent hypothesis fails to solve the consciousness problem. 
 
Positing that we can best describe reality as something about which our 
knowledge is unavoidably impaired has been a recurring theme in philosophy 
since its inception. Given that another of the paradigmatic issues defining the field 
of philosophy is what kind of meaning, if any, life is imbued with, it is also not 
historically uncommon for these two prima facie unconnected themes to find 
common ground in philosophical works. 
What is unique in Tartaglia’s book Philosophy in a Meaningless Life 
(hereafter referred to as “PML”) is how Tartaglia threads these concepts together. 
He posits that questions surrounding the meaning of life, although resolving 
themselves in our ultimate realisation that nihilism is true within the context of 
the physical universe, have enabled us to discover the concept of transcendence 
in attempting to figure out if there is some further context within which it makes 
sense to attribute meaning to our lives. We could only demonstrate nihilism to be 
false using the concept of transcendence, he then argues. This, Tartaglia argues, is 
only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the benefits that can be gleaned from 
considering the possibility of transcendence, as it is also able to provide answers 
to major philosophical questions that have persisted over centuries of thought, 
namely those pertaining to issues of consciousness, universals and time. 
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Although Tartaglia’s approach to each of these issues needs to be addressed, I 
will be objecting in this essay specifically to his claim that positing a transcendent 
reality can be used to solve the problem of consciousness given how prevalent 
discussion of this issue is in contemporary metaphysical inquiry. In particular, I 
will be arguing that even if the idea of transcendence does present itself as an 
option when we consider difficulties in interpreting how consciousness fits into 
the world, accepting the existence of a transcendent reality does nothing to reduce 
these difficulties and in fact can only serve to increase them. As such, Tartaglia 
has failed to demonstrate that the concept of transcendence functions as a useful 
philosophical tool in finding a resolution to the problem of consciousness. 
 
Nihilism and Transcendence 
 
Tartaglia frames philosophical enquiry as stemming from two kinds of 
question about reality. These questions are about “ontology and enframement” or 
“what exists and why it exists” (Tartaglia 2016: 71). Philosophy as a discipline 
arose once these two kinds of question could be answered together using the 
concept of transcendence. 
Transcendence is a rare sort of concept that seems viable as a candidate for 
providing answers to both “what” and “why” questions by positing that the kinds 
of things we familiarly describe as making up the world around us exist within a 
wider context. This means that we are able to suggest that the things around us 
have the nature they do because of this wider context, and thus that we can better 
understand both what the world is and what sort of purpose the constituents of the 
world as we know it are capable of having. 
In asking what purpose life has, which is the initial major question addressed 
in PML, we are asking about the context of meaning within which life itself exists. 
This question is very different to asking what function something used within life 
serves. If I ask what the reason is for you moving a particular piece on a 
chessboard, what I wish to know is how making that move could get you closer 
to your overall goal of checkmating your opponent. Since I assume that your 
action of making that particular move exists within the wider context of your 
intention to checkmate your opponent, my question can be understood as 
addressing the purpose of the single move you just made within that wider 
context. Where the question of the meaning of life differs from the question of the 
meaning of a particular chess move is that humans often do things, such as move 
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chess pieces, because they want to achieve a certain result, whereas it is not clear 
that there is anything outside our various wishes and preferences that is able to 
provide a context within which life as a whole has meaning. The physical 
universe, which science informs us is responsible for our existence, does not seem 
to be the sort of thing capable of having a certain goal in mind. The answer to 
questions about the meaning of life also cannot be provided with essential 
reference to other living beings because we can simply ask the same question 
about them; if we suppose that the purpose of your life is to be useful to other 
people, then this presupposes that the lives of these other people already have 
meaning, which is precisely the question we are trying to answer. Thus, nihilism 
seems to be a logical conclusion to draw from our understanding of how our lives 
fit into the wider context of a physical universe. 
Positing that there may be a further transcendent context that is able to account 
for the physical universe and, ultimately, our lives “provides us with an idea of 
what would be required for nihilism to be false” (ibid.: 52-53). That is, although 
the physical universe is unable to account for life having meaning, the only way 
this could fail to demonstrate that life indeed does not have a meaning is if it were 
the case that the physical universe itself existed within some wider context and 
within that context life serves a particular purpose. While it is ultimately a 
mystery what this purpose would be, this follows from the fact that our 
understanding of transcendent reality necessarily lies outside of our understanding 
in the same way that within the context of a dream we often have no knowledge 
of the physical world (ibid.: 51). Questioning whether or not life has meaning, 
then, ultimately leads us to the concept of transcendence, although it is interesting 
to note that transcendence is equally compatible with either the truth or falsehood 
of nihilism (ibid.: 77). 
This provides a general understanding of how transcendence operates with 
regard to philosophical questions. By framing the physical universe and, more 
importantly, our lives within a wider context, it is possible for those lives to serve 
a purpose. What is important for a critical evaluation of Tartaglia’s position 
though is the manner in which transcendence provides such a context. 
There seems, on the face of it, to be an obvious objection to Tartaglia’s claim 
that transcendent reality could provide a context of meaning within which life 
exists, which is that, in the same sense that the physical universe alone cannot 
provide a context of meaning because the physical universe, if it is all that exists, 
does not itself exist for a purpose, surely it is the case that transcendent reality 
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will necessarily run into the same problem. It is, in fact, difficult to envision 
anything that would be able to provide a context of meaning whilst at the same 
time being immune to questions about the purpose of that. 
Tartaglia’s response to this is to state that this response “betrays a lack of 
imagination” (ibid.: 52). Since we have no awareness of a transcendent context, 
we have nothing to base our assumption that “an account of the purpose of things 
would not culminate in the brute fact of meaningless existence, but rather in the 
fact of purposeful existence” (ibid.: 52). He then states that, “although we cannot 
rule out the possibility, we have no good reason to believe in it either” (ibid.: 52). 
This is an important point when it comes to evaluating Tartaglia’s position 
because it demonstrates how the transcendent hypothesis works as a response to 
philosophical questions. It has the potential to be able to account for meaning in 
life precisely because we have no knowledge of this reality. Even if, as Tartaglia 
suggests may be the case, transcendent reality is also meaningless, the 
transcendent hypothesis still stands as being capable of explaining how life can 
have meaning because our limited conception of that reality prevents us from 
knowing whether it is meaningless or meaningful. The epistemic limitation of the 
transcendent hypothesis is thus precisely what lends its strength to the idea of 
transcendent reality; this reality may be capable of performing a wide variety of 
roles which we struggle to find another viable candidate for in our philosophical 
theories as a result of the fact that our ontology seems not to include the sort of 
things that can account in any clear way for certain phenomena, such as meaning 
and consciousness. 
The trade-off is that by accepting transcendence we open the door to the 
possibility that life has meaning but we also sacrifice any hope of being able to 
provide either a positive or negative answer to that question. We simply must 
accept that we cannot know. 
Accepting a limitation on the knowledge of reality it is possible for us to attain 
is not a problem in and of itself, but when it comes to arguing that the transcendent 
hypothesis constitutes a solution to specific metaphysical problems such as the 
problem of consciousness the issue is different. Because the truth of the 
transcendent hypothesis is equally compatible with nihilism being true or false, it 
does not matter whether or not transcendent reality really is capable of providing 
the metaphysical basis of meaning. There are two possible states of transcendent 
reality in this sense, as being meaningful or meaningless, and we are unable to tell 
which one it is. On the contrary, if the transcendent hypothesis is able to solve the 
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problem of consciousness as Tartaglia states (ibid.: 120), it must only be 
compatible with one possibility, which is that transcendent reality is capable of 
providing the metaphysical basis of experience. Thus the conditions for the truth 
of the transcendent hypothesis are more stringent when it comes to determining 
whether or not it can account for consciousness, and it seems to me clearly 
demonstrable that it does not meet these conditions. 
There are three key arguments that provide the foundation for Tartaglia’s 
transcendent hypothesis, which I will now outline in turn. 
 
1) Consciousness cannot be accounted for by objective thought 
  
Tartaglia defines “objective thought” as our “everyday way of thinking about 
the nature of the world” (ibid.: 83), such as thinking of a cinema room as being 
essentially composed of “objects in space made up of various different types of 
material” (ibid.: 83). This view “readily extends to take in the whole universe: the 
cinema is located on planet Earth, which is itself simply a very large object within 
a vast space containing astronomical objects composed of various materials” 
(ibid.: 83). The way we ordinarily conceive of consciousness as fitting into the 
world as described by objective thought is that a person sitting in a cinema and 
watching the screen has a particular perspective on the objective world that would 
differ from the perspective of any person sitting in a different part of the cinema. 
The trouble arises when we try to explain which aspect of the world as 
described by objective thought is supposed to be able to account for 
consciousness. 
 
there is nothing there to indicate that the organic objects should be centres 
of conscious experience; there is nothing in the scene to indicate that there 
should be any experiential centres at all (ibid.: 84). 
 
Although we “superimpose experiential centres onto the objective world” (ibid.: 
84), there is nothing within objective thought that is able to give us an account of 
why it is the case that any objects should be centres of experience. Objective 
thought seems to be able to readily provide an account of reality that is centreless 
where all objects simply exist in certain places and are made of certain materials, 
but for which there is no perspective. As such, we cannot account for 
consciousness by reference to the world as described by objective thought. This 
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also means that scientific understanding, which is a form of objective thought, 
will be unable to provide us with an explanation of how consciousness fits into 
the world. 
 
2) A transcendent hypothesis solves the problem of consciousness 
  
Tartaglia dismisses the possibility of describing consciousness as an illusion 
produced by brain activity (a view that Tartaglia calls “revisionism”), a view he 
attributes most closely to Dennett (ibid.: 90) since, as he argues, the idea of a 
perceptual illusion relies implicitly on the idea that the individual is having an 
experience that may mismatch reality or otherwise must simply be “nothing more 
than a dumb reflex, rather than a rational if ultimately misguided response to the 
evidence” (ibid.: 93). Using the example of an individual who judges that they are 
having the experience of feeling dizzy, Tartaglia argues that our inclination to 
make such judgements “necessarily lacks any rational explanation on the 
revisionist model, because that model denies that there are any dizzy experiences 
- or anything similar that might be mistaken for one - to provide the evidential 
basis of my false judgement” (ibid.: 93). 
He also dismisses consciousness as being identical to brain activity as he 
believes it to simply lead us back to revisionism. Tartaglia argues that those who 
try to argue that conscious states are simply brain states have not managed to 
properly deal with the basic criticism that conscious properties seem to be 
completely different to properties of the brain (ibid.: 95). Using the example of 
staring into a green light and then seeing an afterimage when you close your eyes, 
he argues that identity theorists such as Smart have attempted to avoid mentioning 
the properties of the afterimage at all by stating that when we perceive an 
afterimage there is simply something going on that is similar to that which 
happens when we are seeing a green light. This attempted evasion, however, 
under-describes the situation since the “something” that is going on when we are 
seeing an afterimage is experiential and thus still requires explanation (ibid.: 96). 
He also dismisses functionalism on the grounds that this attempts to avoid the 
problems of the identity theory by stating that conscious properties are realised by 
physical states rather than being identical to them but, Tartaglia argues, this does 
not avoid the difficulty because the problem is in imagining a physical state being 
sufficient to ‘realize’ an experiential state (ibid.: 96-97). 
Tartaglia also then argues against the position that conscious properties can be 
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identified with properties of the brain by stating that the properties of an 
afterimage would have to be a misconception of the properties of brain states. He 
uses the example of an experience of an after-image that is a green oblong with 
fuzzy edges and states, “If we are actually conceptualizing a brain state, then, we 
must have formed a radically false conception of it, given that it is not green and 
oblong with fuzzy edges” (ibid.: 97). The point being driven toward is that, if we 
have such a radically false conception of our experiences, we have simply ended 
up with revisionism once more. 
Finally, he dismisses dualism as an example of metaphysics finding itself 
“forced to tamper with objective thought’s conception of the world” (ibid.: 102) 
by positing that there is some special attribute of the brain that it is capable of 
interacting with the non-physical, which contradicts what we know from objective 
thought that “the brain is not radically unlike everything else in the world” (ibid.: 
101). 
In place of these problematic perspectives, Tartaglia refers to his 
metaphilosophical considerations earlier in the book and suggests that we are 
plausibly interested in the problem of consciousness because “it raises the 
possibility that reality transcends the objective world” (ibid.: 102). To give a feel 
for how this could explain the nature of consciousness, Tartaglia invites us to 
imagine that transcendent reality stands “to the objective world as the objective 
world stands to a dream” (ibid.: 103). 
 
In that case not only are the dream-trees I see transcended by the wider 
context in which I am asleep; my dream-thoughts must be as well. For any 
reality there is to the thoughts and feelings we have in a dream must be 
found in the real world, not the world of the dream. (ibid.: 103) 
 
The way this is supposed to account for consciousness is by positing that 
consciousness is not ontologically dependent upon the “centreless” constituents 
of the world as described by objective thought, but is rather ontologically 
dependent upon transcendent reality. There are difficulties inherent in 
understanding the nature of the ontological dependency of consciousness upon 
transcendent reality; since “The transcendent context of existence being 
hypothesized is one of which our knowledge is seriously curtailed” (ibid.: 106) 
we have no reason to suppose that we will awaken from our lives into transcendent 
reality. Indeed, this could not be so because if we did awaken into this context of 
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existence “it would not be the final context, since consciousness, according to the 
hypothesis, is always transcendent” (ibid.: 106). As such, although they must have 
some sort of ontological dependence upon transcendent reality in virtue of the fact 
that our entire conception of reality must be ontologically dependent upon the 
final context of existence, experiences cannot be identified with any aspects of 
transcendent reality, “since the transcendent reality of the final context – in which 
independent being is to be found – is not something we could consciously 
experience in such a way as to allow us to distinguish one part of it from another” 
(ibid.: 106). 
Although individual experiences are not aspects of transcendent reality, 
consciousness as a whole is. That is, although experiences are not identical with 
parts of transcendent reality, the awareness we have of those experiences simply 
in virtue of having them is a self-awareness of transcendent reality. Just as in a 
dream our awareness that we are having dream experiences can only be an 
awareness of a world transcending the dream (i.e. that we are lying in bed having 
certain experiences) even while the content of those experiences need not be of 
anything within the world transcending the dream, our awareness that we are 
having everyday experiences must be an awareness of a world transcending 
objective reality even while those experiences are not of transcendent reality 
(ibid.: 106). 
In short, Tartaglia states that the problem of consciousness can be solved by 
the transcendent hypothesis because it does not attempt to describe how a centre 
of experience can fit into the world as described through objective thought, which 
is centreless. Although this does not tell us what would constitute an accurate 
description of the ontological basis of experience, this gap in our understanding 
is attributable to the nature of transcendent reality being unknowable as it is in 
itself, rather than as arising from inconsistencies between our conceptions of the 
objective world and experience. 
 
3) We misconceive experience 
 
Where Tartaglia’s viewpoint distinguishes itself from any form of idealism is 
in its denial that we have a clear and accurate conception of experience. The 
transcendent hypothesis “denies that we have any legitimate conception of 
experience except that it is transcendent” (ibid.: 118). His argument for this 
position is that our conception of experience relies upon concepts borrowed from 
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objective thought; we conceive our experience of a tree as being of “an array of 
colour suitably arranged into the shape of a tree” (ibid.: 110), but this cannot be a 
correct conception of experience because spatial arrangement is something that 
belongs to the objective world and it does not make sense to say that ideas and 
physical objects can both share the same shape. Since when we attend to our 
experience of a tree all we find is “something shaped like a tree” and experience 
cannot have shape, this must be a misconception. This problem applies equally to 
secondary qualities; if our experiences cannot have shapes, then there is nothing 
for phenomenal colours to fill. 
The reason for the misconception is that we are attempting to interpret 
experiences “as if they were things in the objective world, when in actual fact – 
as we realize on further reflection – they have no place there” (ibid.: 111). As such 
it is objective thought that provides us with our dominant description of reality, 
with our conception of experience being parasitic upon this main picture. It is also 
an extremely useful part of our overall picture of the objective world because it 
allows us to explain how it is that somebody can misjudge some aspect of the 
world, such as thinking that a tree has darker leaves than it actually does. 
This leads us to believe that experiences are causally dependent upon the 
brain, which functions “to facilitate our interpretation of reality as an indirect 
awareness of an objective world” (ibid.: 112). Yet, this view must ultimately be 
false because it relies upon a misconception of experience and in actual fact 
“experience does not causally interact with the objective world, and neither is it a 
part of that world; since experience and the objective world are both parts of an 
interpretation of transcendent reality” (ibid.: 112). 
As such, the only thing our conception of experience gets right about the true 
nature of experience is that it exists (ibid.: 117). Furthermore, we should not 
expect to understand the nature of the independent reality underlying experience, 
“since as conscious beings we can only know reality as it appears within 
consciousness; and consciousness is always transcendent” (ibid.: 118). 
So, by virtue of having experience, we know that there exists some reality 
beyond the objective world but experience is unable to tell us any specific details 
about the nature of transcendent reality because of the fact that we misconceive 
experience. 
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How the problem of consciousness persists 
  
Tartaglia attributes the persistence of the problem of consciousness to 
competing schools of thought seeking either to argue that there exist things 
beyond the objective world or seeking to affirm objective thought by denying 
transcendence. By arguing for a hypothesis that puts our conception of objective 
reality before our conception of experience, while still maintaining that 
consciousness does transcend objective reality, the transcendent hypothesis 
“promises to resolve this impasse” (ibid.: 121). 
The supposed advantage of the transcendent hypothesis with relation to the 
problem of consciousness is that it does not try to place centres of experience in a 
world that is posited as being centreless. Even if we do believe it to be inexplicable 
that consciousness should be a part of objective reality, it could be stated that the 
transcendent hypothesis does not provide us with an answer to the problem of 
consciousness on the grounds that believing that consciousness relies on an 
unknowable transcendent reality necessarily leaves the ontological basis of 
consciousness just as far outside the realm of our understanding. Yet there is a 
significant difference between the problem of consciousness that arises in relation 
to objective thought and the problem that arises from considering the epistemic 
limits of the presented conception of a transcendent reality. The claim is that our 
conception of reality as presented by objective thought is of a world precisely in 
which there are no centred parts, such as centres of experience, and thus 
consciousness necessarily lies outside any coherent conception of objective 
reality, whereas we can only ever have a very limited conception of transcendent 
reality and this does not self-evidently demonstrate that consciousness cannot fit 
into transcendent reality. Indeed, the obscure nature of transcendent reality is 
arguably a strength when it comes to avoiding such a problem; it is seemingly 
because we cannot comprehend transcendent reality that we cannot conceive of 
some aspect of transcendent reality that is incapable of forming the ontological 
basis for consciousness. 
Such attributes can be conceived of, however, due to the fact that there are 
certain negative claims we can make about the nature of transcendent reality, 
given that we know that it cannot have the attributes we associate with objective 
reality or experience, since both of these conceptions are what apparently produce 
the problem of consciousness to begin with. To demonstrate, let us take the third 
claim outlined above, that we misconceive experience. Whatever transcendent 
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reality is, under Tartaglia’s account of consciousness, it must be able to account 
for us misconceiving experience. We cannot give an account of this misconception 
fully with reference to objective reality because this would entail revisionism, 
which Tartaglia rejects. However, giving an account of this misconception that 
makes essential reference to some aspect of transcendent reality does not seem 
like a particularly tall order; given that we know so little about transcendent reality 
it does not seem too problematic to state that it is in virtue of some aspect of this 
reality that we end up misconceiving experience even if we are unable to state 
which aspect we are talking about. All we know, then, is that when we 
misconceive experience, or any particular experience, we are actually 
misconceiving some aspect of transcendent reality.  
So, while we cannot know much about transcendent reality, we can know that 
it or some aspects of it are capable of giving rise to various misconceptions of 
experiences. There is a further inference we can make though and that is that, 
whatever it is that forms the ontological basis for our misconceived experiences, 
it cannot be experience itself. Since consciousness is always transcendent, the 
“final context” can never be within consciousness and as such the independent 
reality that forms the ontological basis of experience cannot be experience itself. 
What this means is that experience is ontologically dependent upon something 
non-experiential. If we misconceive experience as being a certain perspective 
within objective reality, given that experience equally cannot inhabit transcendent 
reality, we must ultimately be misconceiving consciousness as being a centre of 
experience. 
If this is so, the misconception of consciousness as a centre of experience must 
have as its ontological basis some feature of transcendent reality, which I will 
refer to as transcendent X. 
 
What is transcendent X? 
 
Perhaps the better way to phrase this question would be not to ask what 
transcendent X is, since we seem to be guaranteed not to have a clear answer to 
this due to the unknowable nature of transcendent reality, but it would be better to 
ask what transcendent X is not. We can know some things that transcendent X 
isn’t. 
For instance, transcendent X cannot be an object or a collection of objects 
because, if it were, it would be just as incapable of forming the ontological basis 
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for consciousness as the world as revealed through objective thought. There 
would be no use in positing a transcendent reality that suffered the exact same 
problems as that of objective reality since this would simply be to retain the same 
philosophical problems but to add a great deal of obscurity to our metaphysical 
picture of reality on top. We can conclude straight away then that transcendent X 
does not fit our conception of any aspect of the world as presented within 
objective thought. 
Transcendent X also cannot be experience because our conceptions of 
experience are misconceptions. Thus, in order for transcendent X to be 
experience, it would have to also be a misconception. 
There is no option here to bite the bullet and simply accept that transcendent 
X is a misconception. It may sound like a logical possibility; after all, we 
necessarily know so little about transcendent reality that stating that we 
misconceive it seems to be almost blatantly obvious. However, this bridge was 
already burned when revisionism was rejected. 
To recap, as Tartaglia stated, we cannot rationally make sense of the idea that 
experience is an illusion produced by objective reality because without experience 
we cannot make sense of the idea of an illusion at all. We need the concept of 
experience to make sense of the idea that you can be aware of something other 
than the way the world actually is. As such, there has to be some ontological basis 
for illusions that, Tartaglia argues, objective thought simply cannot provide. 
Similarly, transcendent X cannot be a misconception in and of itself because 
transcendent X is supposed to be the way the world actually is; transcendent 
reality is conceived as having independent existence. For something to be 
misconceived, it has to be mistakenly supposed to be something other than what 
actually exists and the one thing that has existence beyond how we conceive it, 
according to Tartaglia, is transcendent reality. You can have neither illusions nor 
misconceptions without there being a distinction between appearance and reality, 
whether that’s a difference between what we experience and what is actually 
present in the world or a difference between what we conceive of and what 
actually exists. 
The only available option, then, is for transcendent X to form the ontological 
basis for experience without being experience itself. The trouble here is that, as in 
the case of objective thought providing an explanation of consciousness, 
experience must be accounted for by something non-experiential, which could be 
problematic.  
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There is still plenty of room to muster up a defence of the transcendent 
hypothesis though. After all, the problem with our conception of consciousness 
and objective thought wasn’t that these two things combined cannot describe how 
experience can exist in a world of non-experience, but rather that they cannot 
describe how a centre can exist in a world of centreless parts. As such, in order 
for Tartaglia’s model to not run into the same problem, all that we need to be able 
to say about transcendent X is that it is centred. 
 
Is transcendent X centred? 
 
It is the nature of consciousness as a centre that supposedly forces us to be 
confronted with the problem of consciousness and inspires us to the view of 
transcendence. If consciousness is a centre of some sort, perhaps a centre of 
misconceived experiences, then our only two options are to accept that 
consciousness must either have transcendent X as its ontological basis or it must 
be transcendent X. Although Tartaglia chooses the latter option, neither is 
satisfactory as they both leave us with something remarkably similar to the 
problem of consciousness that they were posited in order to avoid. Let us regard 
these two possibilities in turn. 
If consciousness were dependent upon transcendent X, this would mean that 
a centre of experience were ontologically dependent upon something that was not 
itself a centre of experience. This does not immediately present itself as a problem 
since we have only said that a centre of experience needs to be ontologically 
dependent upon something that can account for centres, not that it necessarily has 
to be ontologically dependent upon a centre of experience in and of itself. Yet, if 
we know about transcendent reality that it is composed of things that are not 
centres of experience, then the situation seems to be remarkably similar to that of 
the original problem that was supposed to lead us to explore the possibility of 
transcendence in the first place. If all we can say about transcendent X is that it is 
not a centre of experience, then once again we are trying to fit centres of 
experience into a world made of things that, even if they are centres of some sort, 
are not centres of experience. 
The trouble is that we make sense of the idea of a centre purely in terms of its 
relation to experience. Consciousness exists as a centre for me because when some 
things happen in my visual field, certain kinds of vibrations in the air reach my 
ears, or my body is affected in particular ways, I experience these things from a 
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particular perspective. Yet, if experience is misconceived, then it cannot be the 
case that my perspective is anything other than a misconception. This would entail 
that our very idea of there being centres of perspective or experience is itself a 
misconception. 
This situation is not helped by simply disregarding the requirement to provide 
an ontological basis for experiences, given that they are misconceived and as such 
do not have an ontological basis. Even if they are misconceptions, these 
misconceptions must be accounted for in the same sense that an illusion must be 
accounted for in a revisionist model of consciousness. We still have to make sense 
of the idea that a centre of experience, whatever that actually is, has as its 
ontological basis something that is not itself a centre of experience. As such, we 
are still left with the conclusion that consciousness must be a misconception. 
If consciousness is a misconception, then this entails that transcendent X must 
be something that is not a centre of experience, which means that consciousness 
still exists in a world that consists of nothing that is so centred. This seems so 
similar to the problem of consciousness that it seems as though we have paid the 
price of assuming that we cannot understand the nature of independent reality in 
order to simply end up with the same problem we started out with. 
If, as Tartaglia concludes, consciousness is transcendent X this may seem to 
resolve the issue. In this case, consciousness has independent existence and does 
not have anything that is not centred as its ontological basis. This seems to evade 
the problem of consciousness neatly. 
The trouble is that consciousness cannot be a centre of experience as we 
ordinarily conceive it. If experience is a misconception, and our notion of 
consciousness is of something that is at the centre of our perceptions and 
perspective, then we must be misconceiving what consciousness is. Our notion of 
a “centre of experience” does not capture what consciousness is, because 
consciousness has independent existence whereas the notion of a centre of 
experience is a misconception. 
As such, even if consciousness is a centre in some sense, it is not a centre of 
experience, and as I have suggested it is not entirely clear what the notion of a 
centre even really means once we consider experience and perspective to be 
misconceived. This means that under the transcendent hypothesis, I still have to 
attempt to make sense of the idea of a centre of experience fitting into a world 
consisting of things that are not themselves centred. Once again, we seem to have 
arrived at something that seems like almost a trivial re-wording of the original 
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problem of consciousness and as such we seem to have travelled a great distance 
with no perceptible gain. 
Unfortunately, this seems to exhaust all of the available options. Either 
consciousness is a centre of experience that is ontologically dependent upon 
centreless parts, or our centre of experience is misconceived as being a part of 
consciousness. The first option leaves us with something closely resembling the 
problem of consciousness, since consciousness still must be accounted for in 
terms of centreless parts, and the second option also leaves us with something 
closely resembling the problem of consciousness, since centres of experience still 
must be accounted for in terms of centreless parts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, Tartaglia offers an original and ambitious alternative to the 
accepted model of consciousness fitting into an everyday conception of objective 
thought. It strives to avoid the problem of consciousness by taking away objective 
reality’s role in providing the ontological basis for consciousness and giving that 
role to the mysterious transcendent reality instead. 
The trouble is that even if we cannot understand transcendent reality, using 
the same arguments that Tartaglia uses to oppose other positions, such as what he 
calls “revisionism,” we are able to determine that transcendent reality cannot have 
any features that would be required to account for consciousness in any better way 
than objective reality. 
Given that the motivation here for accepting the transcendent hypothesis was 
supposed to be to avoid the problem of consciousness, winding up with more or 
less the same problem defuses this inclination to move to such a position entirely. 
